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CRAIG MABLE,  
a/k/a Paradise 
 
                CRAIG MABLE, 
                              Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 1-05-cr-00357-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Yvette Kane 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 27, 2011 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, and SMITH, Circuit Judges, 
and STEARNS, District Judge* 
 
(Filed: January 31, 2011) 
                              
 
  OPINION 
                              
      
STEARNS, District Judge.  
                                                          
* The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the United States 
District Court of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.   
 On November 1, 2005, Craig Mable pled guilty in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania to a one-count Superseding Information charging him with possession with 
intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(c).  The 
plea was entered pursuant to a written plea agreement.  At a May 8, 2006 sentencing 
hearing, Chief Judge Kane determined that Mable was a career offender with an 
automatic criminal history category of VI and an adjusted total offense level of 29, 
yielding an advisory guideline range of 151-188 months.  The United States moved for a 
departure from the Sentencing Guidelines based upon Mable’s substantial assistance.  
The District Court granted the motion and imposed a sentence of 96 months.   
 After Mable’s sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission amended the 
Sentencing Guidelines by revising part of the drug quantity table.  U.S.S.G. App. C, 
Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007).  Amendment 706 reduced the base offense levels for crack 
cocaine offenses in most cases by two levels.   See United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 
154 (3d Cir. 2009).  In 2008, the Sentencing Commission made Amendment 706 
retroactively applicable.  U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008).  On 
December 3, 2008, Mable filed a motion for a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2).  In an Order dated May 5, 2009, Chief Judge Kane denied Mabel’s motion, 
explaining that Mable had been sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, 
and not under crack cocaine Guideline § 2D1.1.  This appeal followed.  
 Mable’s counsel has now moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967).  In United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001), we 
explained that an Anders brief must demonstrate that counsel has “thoroughly examined 
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the record in search of appealable issues,” and the brief must “explain why the 
[identified] issues are frivolous.”  Our inquiry is twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately 
fulfilled the requirements of Anders; and (2) “whether an independent review of the 
record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  Id. (citing United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 
778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (explaining that the court must 
proceed, “after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is 
wholly frivolous.”).  If the review fails to reveal any nonfrivolous issues, the court “may 
grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.”  Id. 
 Counsel has fulfilled his obligation under Anders.  His brief sets out the relevant 
facts of the case and correctly explains that the District Court’s denial of Mable’s § 
3582(c)(2) motion is the only possible appealable issue.  As counsel recognizes, because 
Mable was sentenced as a career offender, there is no merit to his appeal.  As we 
concluded in Mateo, “Amendment 706 simply ‘provides no benefit to career offenders.’”  
560 F.3d at 155, quoting United States v. Forman, 553 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2009).  
See also Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2694 (2010) (“As noted, § 3582(c)(2) 
does not authorize a resentencing.  Instead it permits a sentence reduction within the 
narrow bounds established by the Commission[] . . . ‘and shall leave all other guideline 
application decisions unaffected.’”) (quoting § 1B1.10(b)(1)).   
 Based on our own review of the record, we agree with Mable’s counsel that there 
is no nonfrivolous issue meriting consideration on appeal.  For that reason, we will affirm 
the order of the District Court denying Mable’s § 3582(c)(2) motion for reduction of 
sentence and we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.  We certify that the issues 
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presented in the appeal lack legal merit and thus do not require the filing of a petition for 
writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(b).  
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